We have proposed two key concepts -focus and visibility -as modalities of modal logic. Scott-Montague models that we have proposed represent properties of visibility and focus and the concept that p is visible as modal sentence Vp and p is clearly visible -or is in focus -as modal sentence Cp.
Introduction
Granular computing, based on rough set theory [1, 2] , provides the basis for a new computing paradigm [3, 4] . Applying granular computing to logical reasoning processes, we have proposed granular reasoning for connecting possible world semantics and granular computing [5] , and developed a granular reasoning framework called a zooming reasoning system [6] [7] [8] . The key concept of zooming reasoning system is focus, which represents atomic sentences that appear in each step of reasoning, where it is enough to consider truth values of atomic sentences used in the current step, letting us ignore truth values of other atomic sentences not used by constructing equivalent classes of possible worlds based on truth values of the atomic sentences appearing in the current reasoning step. Focus thus provides a three-valued truth valuation that assigns truth values true or false to atomic sentences that appear in focus and assigns a truth value unknown to other atomic sentences. In the zooming reasoning system, controlling the size of equivalent classes of possible worlds corresponds to reasoning.
In redefining the concept of focus, we have introduced the granularity concept of visibility [9] . In granular reasoning, visibility and focus are analogies of terms in vision, representing the following concepts:
1. Visibility: the set of atomic sentences that must be considered in the current step of reasoning, corresponding to focus in the zooming reasoning system.
Focus (redefined)
: the set of atomic sentences for which truth values are decidable as either true or false.
Visibility separates all sentences into visible sentences, i.e., sentences we consider, and invisible sentences, which we do not consider. We have also constructed four-valued truth valuations based on visibility and focus, which illustrate the concepts of clearly visible, obscurely visible, and invisible [9, 10] . We have not, however, considered other types of visibility and focus, e.g., by modality or algebraic structures.
We capture the concepts of visibility and focus as modalities, producing Scott-Montague models that represent properties of visibility and focus and represent the concept that p is visible as modal sentence Vp and p is clearly visible -or is in focus -as modal sentence Cp. Note that this is a revised, extended version of our conference paper [11] .
Background

Modal Logic, Kripke and Scott-Montague Models
Let P be a set of (at most countably infinite) atomic sentences. We construct language L ML (P) for modal logic from P using logical operators (truth constant), ⊥ (falsity constant), ¬ (negation), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), → (material implication), ↔ (equivalence), and two modal operators 2 (necessity) and 3 (possibility) and using the following rules:
A sentence is called nonmodal if it contains no modal operators. We denote L (P) to mean the set of all nonmodal sentences.
Kripke models [12] 
Conditions of accessibility relation R such that reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity correspond to axiom schemata of modal logic.
Scott-Montague models -or minimal models [12] 
For every Kripke model
for every w ∈ W and every X ⊆ W . Function N in M SM satisfies above conditions (m), (c), and (n), and the following condition:
where N(w) is the intersection of all sets in N(w). Kripke models are thus special cases of Scott-Montague models.
Smallest classical modal logic E is proved to be both sound and complete with respect to the class of all ScottMontague models, where E contains schema Df 3. 3p ↔ ¬2¬p and rule of inference
with rules and axiom schemata of propositional logic. Each condition of N corresponds to axiom schema such that Let Γ ⊂ L (P) be a finite set of nonmodal sentences considered in the current reasoning step. Using Γ, we introduce the concept of visibility and redefined focus in the current reasoning step. Formally, definitions of visibility Vs(Γ) and focus Fc(Γ) relative to Γ are as follows:
where Sub(Γ) is the set of all subsentences of sentences in Γ. and Γ |= p means that, for any possible world w ∈ W , if M , w |= q for any sentence q ∈ Γ then M , w |= p. Using truth valuation function v, we construct agreement relation R Vs(Γ) based on visibility Vs(Γ) as follows:
Agreement relation R Vs(Γ) is easily confirmed as an equivalence relation, and R Vs(Γ) therefore induces quotient set
, the set of all equivalent classes of possible worlds in W . We also construct truth valuationṽ Vs(Γ) for equivalent classes of possible worlds
Three-valued valuationṽ Vs(Γ) is defined by: As stated in Section 1, we intend for the concept of visibility to separate all sentences into visible sentences, i.e., sentences we consider, and invisible sentences, which we do not consider. In the definition of three-valued truth valuation by (12) , we intend that the interpretation of truth value / 0 is "not considered," and letting the truth value of all invisible sentences be / 0 via three-valued truth tables (Table 1) , we separate all nonmodal sentences into visible and invisible sentences by truth values because visibility Vs(Γ) consists of atomic sentences considered in the current reasoning step, meaning that any other sentences that contain some invisible atomic sentence p ∈ Vs(Γ) are also invisible, that is, not considered in the current reasoning step. For extending the concept of visibility naturally to every nonmodal sentence, we consider that the truth value of such invisible sentences should be neither T nor F, and therefore should be / 0. Table 2) . We denote extended four-valued truth valuation using same notation v Fc (Γ) . As with the three-valued case, for any clearly visible sentences p and q, ¬p, p ∧ q, p ∨ q, and p → q are also clearly visible. There is thus at least one equivalent class w ∈ W such that v Fc(Γ) (p, w) = {T} for all p ∈ Γ.
Note, however, that not all two-valued tautologies are satisfied byṽ Fc(Γ) . For any invisible sentence p and obscurely visible sentence q, for example, exclusive middle is not satisfied:
In the definition of four-valued truth valuation by (15), we intend that truth values {T} and {F} correspond to true and false in the sense of two-valued truth valuation. The interpretation of truth value {T, F} we intend is "unknown" and / 0 is "not considered." As defined in Definition 2, we intend that the concept of focus separates all visible sentences into clearly visible sentences, i.e., sentences whose truth values are uniquely determined to be either true or false in the current reasoning step, and obscurely visible sentences that appear in the current reasoning step, but those truth values are not uniquely determined. With this intention, we set the truth value of obscurely visible atomic sentences by {T, F}. We also consider that all invisible sentences under the concept of visibility should still be invisible even though the concept of focus is applied. Based on the definition of three-valued truth valuation by (12), we set the truth value of invisible atomic sentences by / 0. 
To extend the concept of focus naturally to every nonmodal sentence as with visibility, we set the truth value of any nonmodal sentence ( Table 2 ). Given that truth values of sentences p, q ∈ L (P) are either {T} or {F} or {T, F}, truth valuations of sentences ¬p, p ∨ q, p ∧ q, and p → q ( Table 2 ) are identical to Kleene's strong threevalued logic [13] . Based on the above discussion on invisible sentences, we set the truth value of sentences that contain invisible sentences by / 0 ( Table 2) . Example 1: Let P = {p, q, r} be a set of atomic sentences and W be a nonempty set that has the following eight possible worlds:
We define the truth value of each atomic sentence p ∈ P at each world w ∈ W by v(p, w) = t ⇐⇒ p ∈ w. With this truth assignment, for example, all atomic sentences are true at w 1 but all atomic sentences are false at w 8 .
Suppose we have the following set of nonmodal sentences considered in the current reasoning step Γ = {q, p → q}. We have visibility Vs(Γ) and focus Fc(Γ) relative to Γ as follows: Vs(Γ) = {p, q}, Fc(Γ) = {q}.
Constructing agreement relation R Vs (Γ) by (10), we have the following four equivalent classes of possible worlds:
Each atomic sentence has the following three-valued truth value: 
Granular Reasoning and Scott-Montague Models
Visibility as Modality
In considering the concept of visibility by modality based on Scott-Montague models, suppose we have quotient setW of W by agreement relation R Vs(Γ) based on visibility Vs(Γ) relative to Γ and nonmodal sentence p is visible atw ∈W . Instead of modal operator 2, we use modal operator V, and we read Vp as p is visible. We 
For (c), suppose X ∈ N Vs(Γ) (w) and Y ∈ N Vs(Γ) (w). By Definition 3, there are some J, K ⊆W such that X = J and Y = K. It is easily confirmed that X ∩ Y = {x ∩ỹ |x ∈ J,ỹ ∈ K}, and eitherx ∩ỹ =x or x ∩ỹ = / 0 because bothx andỹ are equivalent classes of W . X ∩Y is therefore a union of equivalent classes, which concludes X ∩Y ∈ N Vs(Γ) (w).
For (n), it is trivial that W = W ∈ N Vs(Γ) (w). For (4), suppose X ∈ N Vs(Γ) (w). From Definition 3, we have X ∈ N Vs(Γ) (w) for all w ∈ W . Therefore {x ∈ W | X ∈ N(x)} = W and W ∈ N Vs(Γ) (w) by (n).
For (5), suppose X ∈ N Vs(Γ) (w). As with (4), we have X ∈ N Vs(Γ) (w) for all w ∈ W and therefore {x ∈ W | X ∈ N(x)} = W ∈ N Vs(Γ) (w).
For (v!), suppose X ∈ N Vs(Γ) (w). There is some J ⊆W such that X = J. 
Combining these lemmas yields the following result: We have Vs(Γ) = {p, q}, so atomic sentences p and q are visible but r is invisible. For these atomic sentences, we have the following truth sets: 
Focus as Modality
As with visibility, we capture the concept of focus by modality based on Scott-Montague models. Focus Fc(Γ) relative to Γ divides all visible sentences into clearly visible and obscurely visible. For any clearly visible sentence p, using modal operator C, we denote Cp to mean that p is clearly visible. We show the focus by some ScottMontague model M Fc(Γ) as follows: Let W be the quotient set of setW by agreement relation R Fc(Γ) based on focus Fc(Γ), and w ∈ W be an equivalent class of elements inW . For each possible world x ∈ỹ such thatỹ ∈ W : 
if Fc(Γ) = / 0, and x ∈ ∪ w {W, / 0}, otherwise.
. (18) Function N Fc(Γ) is easily confirmed to be well defined by Definition 5. The key to this construction is set U( w), which provides "units" of construction at each possible world x ∈ w. U( w) does not contain any equivalent classes of possible worldsỹ in w because we must capture the property that atomic sentence p is visible if and only if p is true at all equivalent classes of possible worlds in w or false at all equivalent classes of possible worlds in w. If someỹ ∈ w are contained in U( w), atomic sentence q ∈ Vs(Γ) \ Fc(Γ) may become "clearly visible." Therefore, noỹ ∈ w should be included in U( w).
N Vs(Γ) and N Fc(Γ) differ as follows: (1) N Vs(Γ) treats all combinations of unions of equivalent classes inW as a "unit" of consideration, while N Fc(Γ) treats some restricted parts of combinations of equivalent classes inW because we must distinguish between clearly visible sentences and obscurely visible sentences using function N Fc(Γ) , and concept that p is clearly visible -or is in focus -requires that p is either {T} or {F} at all equivalent classes in w. We omit the proof of Lemma 3 because it is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 1.
In general, however, function N Fc(Γ) does not satisfy conditions (4) ity and focus. Combination with other modal logic, especially, logic of knowledge and belief [14] , and logic of time [15] are also of interest. We must also consider relationships among our framework and zooming reasoning systems [6] [7] [8] .
